The Cost of Unplanned Railway Development
In June 2024, Bangladesh and India agreed to expand railway connectivity and allow Indian trains to use Bangladeshi tracks under a transit arrangement. The proposed trial route would enter Bangladesh through Gede–Darshana and leave through Chilahati–Haldibari before re-entering India.
But this is not the shortest or most strategically important route India could potentially use through Bangladesh. A much more direct connection between Kolkata and India's northeast would run through the Benapole–Dhaka–Tongi–Akhaura–Agartala corridor. That route could dramatically shorten access to Tripura and other northeastern states. One regional analysis estimated that Kolkata–Agartala rail movement could fall from roughly 1,600 km through the existing Indian network to around 500 km through Bangladesh.
Yet an Indian broad-gauge train cannot simply enter through Benapole and continue to Agartala. The reason is surprisingly basic: Bangladesh still does not have one compatible railway gauge across the corridor. That makes India's transit problem part of a much larger story about how Bangladesh developed its railway network.
Bangladesh Has Known About the Gauge Problem for Years
Bangladesh inherited two different railway systems. The western railway network historically used broad gauge, while most of the eastern network used metre gauge. Dual-gauge track was later introduced so both types of train could use the same corridor.
This creates a basic interoperability problem. A broad-gauge locomotive or coach cannot operate on a metre-gauge-only track without changing equipment or transferring traffic.
Bangladesh Railway's 2010–2030 Master Plan identified gauge rationalization as a major strategic priority. The plan was researched largely in 2006–07 and formally adopted in 2013.
At the time, the network consisted approximately of:
64% metre-gauge track
24% broad-gauge track
12% dual-gauge track
The Master Plan's long-term objective went beyond simply adding dual gauge. It called for Bangladesh to move gradually toward a nationwide broad-gauge network, while dual gauge would allow the transition to happen without immediately abandoning existing metre-gauge rolling stock. The policy direction was therefore already clear, but the implementation was much less consistent.
The Dhaka–Chattogram Corridor Shows the Problem
No railway corridor illustrates this better than Dhaka–Chattogram. It is Bangladesh's most important railway connection, linking the capital with the country's main seaport. It is also strategically important for regional connectivity because trains heading toward Akhaura and India's northeast share significant parts of the route.
Yet Bangladesh upgraded different sections of this corridor using different gauge standards. By the early 2020s, the system effectively looked like this:
Dhaka–Tongi: dual-gauge track
Tongi–Bhairab–Akhaura: metre-gauge double track
Akhaura–Laksam: dual-gauge double track
Laksam–Chattogram: predominantly metre-gauge double track
The 72-km Akhaura–Laksam project demonstrates what a coordinated upgrade could look like. Bangladesh converted the existing line and constructed another line as dual gauge, with ADB supporting the project as part of a major regional connectivity corridor.
The decision immediately north of it was very different. The 64-km Tongi–Bhairab section is critical because both Chattogram-bound and Sylhet-bound trains use it.
Bangladesh Doubled Tongi–Bhairab but Kept It Metre Gauge
Bangladesh began developing a second line on the Tongi–Bhairab section under an ADB-supported railway investment programme. China Railway Group was contracted to construct the project, and the double line was formally opened in February 2016.
But the new infrastructure remained metre gauge. This happened even while Bangladesh Railway was already discussing the need for gauge standardization. In 2014, a parliamentary committee was told that BR was spending more than Tk 2,000 crore on the new Tongi–Bhairab metre-gauge track while railway officials and former officials were publicly arguing for a uniform network.
The financial history makes the decision more significant. ADB's later completion assessment found that the Tongi–Bhairab subproject's cost increased by 146%, from about $108 million at appraisal to $266 million. Bangladesh therefore made a very large investment to increase capacity on the corridor without removing one of its most important long-term technical constraints.
Now the Same Track Needs Another Conversion
The consequences were predictable. Bangladesh Railway later carried out feasibility work to convert the Tongi–Bhairab–Akhaura metre-gauge double track into dual gauge.
A 2022 report on railway investment described the existing Tongi–Akhaura section as metre-gauge double track and confirmed that feasibility work had already been undertaken for its conversion. Regional transport planning documents have also identified conversion of Tongi–Bhairab to dual gauge as a necessary future project.
The infrastructure that was modernized only years earlier therefore requires another major modernization programme. This does not prove corruption, and there is not enough evidence to claim that officials deliberately selected metre gauge so another project could later be created.
But it does demonstrate something that can be measured: Bangladesh invested heavily in infrastructure without fully resolving a known network-standardization problem, creating the need for additional investment later.
India’s Agartala Link Exposed the Contradiction
The irony became clearer when India and Bangladesh completed the Akhaura–Agartala cross-border rail connection. The project was inaugurated in November 2023 with Indian grant assistance of INR 392.52 crore. It covers 12.24 km, including 6.78 km of dual-gauge track inside Bangladesh.
The link gives Agartala a railway gateway into Bangladesh. But that does not mean an Indian broad-gauge train can continue seamlessly toward Dhaka and Benapole. Between Akhaura and Tongi sits the metre-gauge bottleneck.
Bangladesh Railway's own director general acknowledged the consequence after the 2024 transit agreement. Direct Kolkata transit through the Agartala–Akhaura route was not possible because the railway between Akhaura and Tongi remained metre gauge.
This is what makes the issue more than a domestic engineering problem. A railway-standard decision made years earlier now limits Bangladesh's ability to use its geographic position for regional transit.
The 2024 Transit Route Avoids the Bottleneck
The route selected for the proposed Indian train trial reflects this reality. Indian trains were proposed to travel from Gede to Darshana, then through Ishwardi, Abdulpur and Parbatipur before leaving Bangladesh through Chilahati–Haldibari.
That route uses Bangladesh's western and northern network, where broad-gauge interoperability with India is much easier. It can provide useful connectivity, but it does not offer the same geographical advantage as cutting directly across Bangladesh toward Agartala. The shortest strategic corridor remains constrained by infrastructure inside Bangladesh itself.
The Problem Is Bigger Than India
India makes the contradiction visible, but India is not the main reason Bangladesh should solve it. A unified railway network would allow Bangladesh to use locomotives and coaches more flexibly between regions, improve freight connectivity with Chattogram Port and reduce the operational barriers between the eastern and western networks.
Gauge compatibility also matters for regional systems such as the Trans-Asian Railway. Bangladesh Railway's own Master Plan argued that future national and regional connectivity made gauge rationalization essential.
The problem is therefore not that Bangladesh refused India a particular route. The deeper problem is that Bangladesh cannot fully use the route itself.
Expensive Infrastructure Needs Consistent Planning
There is also no evidence that China Railway Group, as the contractor for Tongi–Bhairab, was responsible for choosing metre gauge. Contractors normally construct projects according to specifications approved by the project owner, and the available documents do not establish that the Chinese company determined Bangladesh Railway's gauge policy.
The stronger criticism belongs at the planning level. Bangladesh Railway had already identified network fragmentation as a strategic problem. Yet one major corridor was doubled as metre gauge while another section of the same corridor was later developed as dual gauge.
Years later, feasibility studies were required to convert the earlier investment again. That is the real lesson of the India transit debate. Infrastructure decisions can survive for decades, while governments, diplomatic priorities and trade routes change much faster.
Bangladesh sits between India's mainland and northeast and beside major regional trade corridors. That geography can be an economic asset only if the physical network is capable of using it.
The country does not need to build railways primarily for India. It needs to build a railway system that works as one network for Bangladesh first. If that system is technically interoperable, Bangladesh can then decide how regional transit should be used based on its own economic, commercial and strategic interests.
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